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I. INTRODUCTION
John wanted to buy a new winter coat. He had seen one he
liked at a store downtown, but the store did not have his size. He
could have had the store order it for him, but he instead decided
to order it off of the store's website and have it sent right to his
house. After John placed the order, he realized he had saved a
few dollars because the website had not charged him tax on his
purchase. ' John thought maybe this lack of taxation was illegal,
but he was unsure of the law. Furthermore, he had benefited
from it by getting a cheaper jacket, and no one else besides the
store knew about this transaction. So why should John worry or
complain?
As this type of transaction becomes more common, states
have a growing interest in ensuring that tax is collected when
the law requires it. However the buyer and seller have no incen-
tive to report any tax avoidance, 2 and it is difficult for any other
parties to identify such misbehavior.
Thus some states, with the help of clever plaintiffs, have
found a new way to try to handle these problems of lost revenues
and skewed incentives. Many states have passed false claims
acts based on the federal False Claims Act ("FCA"), which allows
citizens to bring suits on behalf of the government against par-
ties who have knowingly defrauded the government. 3 Such citi-
t BS 2003, University of Scranton; MS 2005 Vanderbilt University; JD Candidate
2009, University of Chicago.
I For the sake of the example, assume that he also got free shipping, so he really got
a better bargain.
2 The seller benefits by attracting purchasers with tax-free sales, and the buyer
benefits by paying tax-free prices.
3 False Claims Act, Pub L No 99-562 § 2, 100 Stat 3153 (1986), codified at 31 USC
§§ 3729-33 (2000) ("A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for
the person and for the United States Government.").
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zens then share in any damages the government collects. 4 These
false claims acts provide incentives for people like John, or em-
ployees of the company where John bought his coat, to report
frauds such as uncollected taxes.
Several hurdles, however, stand between such plaintiffs and
a collection. The history behind the false claims acts makes it
unclear whether plaintiffs should be allowed to bring tax fraud
issues on behalf of the government. Beyond that, the statutory
language of the false claims acts sets up requirements that may
be difficult for plaintiffs to satisfy when trying to bring a tax
fraud claim. And finally, the tax law surrounding internet trans-
actions is quite complex, which only adds to the plaintiffs' bur-
den.
The steady increase in internet purchases makes it quite
important to understand the situations, if there are any, in
which plaintiffs can satisfy the requirements and bring a suc-
cessful claim for tax fraud related to an internet purchase. As
such, this Comment analyzes the circumstances under which
purchasers of goods over the internet may use state false claims
acts to bring successful claims alleging tax violations against
online retailers.
Part II of this Comment provides a brief overview of the his-
tory and development of the Federal False Claims Act ("FCA"),
outlining some of the purposes of the act, as well as some of the
problems associated with it. Part III discusses the emergence of
the state false claims act, looking specifically to how these acts
are similar and different from the Federal FCA, and how those
similarities and differences inform the understanding of the
state false claims acts. Part IV discusses the overlap of the tax
issues involved in internet transactions and the state false
claims acts, describing the mechanics of taxing internet pur-
chases. Part V looks at the challenges that face false claims acts
plaintiffs, and argues for circumstances in which such plaintiffs
should be successful when bringing tax claims under the state
false claims acts. Part VI concludes by summarizing instances in
which a purchaser of goods over the internet can serve as a whis-
tleblower and bring a successful use tax claim through state false
claims statutes.
4 31 USC § 3730(d) (discussing awards to private plaintiffs).
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II. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
State false claims acts are to a large extent modeled after
the Federal FCA. As a result, state false claims acts cannot be
understood without a good understanding of the development of
the Federal FCA.
A. Original Enactment, Original Problems
In 1863, at the urging of President Abraham Lincoln, Con-
gress enacted the first version of what is today known as the
Federal False Claims Act. 5 Lincoln wanted to provide a mecha-
nism for fighting the growing number of individuals selling de-
fective goods to the Union Army. 6 During this time, "for sugar
[the government] often got sand; for coffee, rye; for leather, some-
thing no better than brown paper; for sound horses and mules,
spavined beasts and dying donkeys; and for serviceable muskets
and pistols, the experimental failures of sanguine inventors or
the refuse of shops and foreign armories."7 More often than not,
these frauds went unpunished because of the absence of federal
agencies to prosecute them.8 Lincoln sought to combat these
fraudulent transactions by allowing citizens to bring suits on be-
half of the government. 9
Suits under the FCA took the name qui tam actions. Qui
tam is an abbreviation of the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino
rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur," which means "who
as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter."10 To give
citizens incentive to bring a qui tam action, the original version
of the FCA rewarded the private party who initiated the suit,
known as the relator, with up to half of the government's mone-
tary recovery. 1
5 Act of March 2, 1863, ch 67, 12 Stat 696 (1863).
6 HR 4827, 99th Cong, 2d Sess in 132 Cong Rec H 6474 (Sept 9, 1986) (statement of
Representative Berman).
7 Robert Tomes, Fortunes of War, 29 Harper's New Monthly Magazine 227, 228 (July
1864). Further, according to Webster's New World Dictionary, spavined means "affected
with spavin," where spavin is "a disease of horses in which a deposit of bone ... or an
infusion of lymph ... develops in the hock joint, usually causing lameness." See David B.
Guralnik, ed, Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language 1366 (Prentice
Hall 2d ed 1985).
8 Marc S. Rapsanti and David M. Laigaie, Current Practice and Procedure under the
Whistleblower Provisions of the Federal False Claims Act, 71 Temp L Rev 23, 24 (1998).
9 Id.
10 Black's Law Dictionary (West 8th ed 2004).
11 Act of March 2, 1863, ch 67, 12 Stat 696 (1863).
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After the Civil War, the number of such fraudulent actions
greatly decreased, and the FCA lay dormant, most likely because
of a large decrease in government spending. 12 However, begin-
ning in the 1930s and continuing into the 1940s and the era of
the New Deal, as government spending increased, petitioners
began exploiting the FCA by bringing so-called "parasitic" ac-
tions. 13 These actions began when petitioners learned of fraud
through public channels, perhaps from previous allegations or
court proceedings against a party, or from a newspaper article
reporting or alleging a party's wrongdoing. 14 The relators then
used that public information to bring a suit on the government's
behalf, hoping to collect part of the damages, all the while con-
tributing nothing new to the action. 15
Marcus v Hess'6 provides a paradigmatic example. The peti-
tioner in that case relied on information from a previous indict-
ment of the defendants to bring a claim under the FCA. 17 The
government argued that the FCA should not allow a petitioner
who did not contribute any new information to bring such a
suit.18 The Court, however, using a strict reading of the FCA,
found no specific textual requirement that the relator must con-
tribute some new or unique information to the suit, and hence
allowed the petitioner to bring the suit.19 The petitioner eventu-
ally collected $75,000,20 roughly $898,000 in today's money. 21
12 James Roy Moncus III, Note, The Marriage of the False Claims Act and the Free-
dom of Information Act: Parasitic Potential or Positive Synergy?, 55 Vand L Rev 1549,
1554-55 (2002) ('The FCA essentially lay dormant between the Civil War and the New
Deal, most likely due to the lack of significant government spending."),
13 Doe v John Doe Corp, 960 F2d 318, 321 (2d Cir 1992).
14 Id at 319.
15 Id.
16 317 US 537 (1943).
17 Id at 539 n 1. The fraud involved a system of rigged bids by electrical contractors
for government projects. The respondents had already faced indictment and fines for
defrauding the government through these same bids for which they were currently being
sued. 'The appellants, the officers and members of the Electrical Contractors Association
of Pittsburgh, conspired to rig the bidding on [government] projects. The pattern of the
collusion was the informal and private averaging of the prospective bid which might have
been submitted by each appellant. An appellant chosen by the others would then submit
a bid for the averaged amount and the others all submitted higher estimates. The gov-
ernment was thereby defrauded in that it was compelled to contribute more for the elec-
tric work on the projects than it would have been required to pay had there been free
competition in the open market."
18 Id at 545.
19 Id at 546.
20 Hess, 317 US at 546.
21 This figure was calculated using the Bureau of Labor Statistics' inflation adjustor,
which is based on the average Consumer Price Index for a given year. See
[2008:
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B. 1943 Amendments
Following Marcus, an increasing number of relators brought
suits based on newspaper reports of indictments. 22 This growth
in qui tam actions helped lead Congress to amend the original
FCA in 1943.23 Then-Attorney General Francis Biddle asked
Congress to abolish the qui tam provisions altogether. 24 Al-
though Congress did not adopt this polar proposal, it did sub-
stantially amend the FCA.25
The amendments altered the relators' rights in three main
ways. First, the 1943 amendments denied recovery to relators
who brought claims "based upon evidence or information in the
possession of the United States, or any agency, officer or em-
ployee thereof, at the time such suit was brought."26 Second, the
amendments allowed the Justice Department to take control of
such proceedings, reducing the control the relator had over the
case, and allowing the government to dismiss or settle the case. 27
Furthermore, when the government took over the case, the rela-
tor's share of the proceeds was capped at one-tenth of the recov-
ered amount. 28 Third, even if a relator overcame these previous
restrictions and brought a successful suit, the amendments de-
creased the relator's share of the recovery from 50 percent to a
maximum of 25 percent. 29  Together, these amendments
"thwarted the effectiveness of the False Claims Act," as they
made it both more difficult and less economically attractive for a
petitioner to bring a claim. 30
<http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl> (last visited Apr 13, 2008); < http://www.bls.gov/cpiI
cpicalc.htm> (last visited Apr 13, 2008).
22 Note, The Federal False Claims Act: The Informer As Plaintiff, 69 Harv L Rev
1081, 1108 n 17 (1955) (citing a letter from Attorney General Francis Biddle noting that
eighteen of the nineteen pending cases were based on "information obtained from indict-
ments").
23 False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, S Rep No 99-345, 99th Cong, 2d Sess
(1986), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 5266, 5276.
24 Id.
25 See, for example, Act of Dec 23, 1943, ch 377, at § 3491(c) (denying recovery to
relators who raised claims "based upon evidence or information in the possession of the
United States, or any agency, officer or employee thereof, at the time such suit was
brought").
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Act of Dec 23, 1943, ch 377, at § 3941(E)(1), (2).
30 Id.
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C. 1986 Amendments
By the 1980s, Congress realized that these amendments had
created a situation similar to the pre-Civil-War passage of the
original act, where fraud against the government went seemingly
unchecked. 31 In 1986, Congress once again "reinvigorated the
False Claims Act with the express intention of recruiting qui tam
relators and their counsel in the fight against fraud."32 The 1986
amendments expanded the relator's rights by, among other
things, increasing the financial reward available to the relator
and allowing the relator to remain a party even after the gov-
ernment had intervened and decided to take on the case itself.33
Furthermore, Congress narrowed and better specified the infor-
mational restrictions on relators, saying that no relator could
base an action "upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a
congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office
report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media,
unless ... the person bringing the action is an original source of
the information."34
Another feature of the 1986 amendments was to allow so-
called "reverse false claims." 35 Reverse false claims involve situa-
tions where a party attempts to avoid paying the government, or
under-represents a debt owed the government, rather than over-
charging the government, as in a traditional false claim. 36 This
language in the amended FCA allowing reverse false claims
opened the door for tax fraud claims, as people committing tax
fraud under-represent a payment owed to the government,
rather than over-representing a payment owed by the govern-
ment. Congress quickly closed that door with the explicit exclu-
sion of tax issues, as the 1986 amendments also made it so the
FCA did "not apply to claims, records, or statements made under
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986." 37
31 False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, S Rep No 99-345, 99th Cong, 2d Sess
(1986), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 5266, 5273.
32 Raspanti, 71 Temp L Rev 23, 26 (cited in note 8).
33 31 USC § 3730(d)(1).
34 31 USC § 3730(e)(4)(A).
35 False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, S Rep No 99-345, 99th Cong, 2d Sess, at 18
(1986), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 5266, 5283.
36 Lissack v Sakura Global Capital Markets, 377 F3d 145, 152 (2d Cir 2004).
37 False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, S Rep No 99-345, 99th Cong, 2d Sess, at 18
(1986), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 5266, 5283.
458 [2008:
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Congress likely included this exemption of tax issues to re-
frain from interfering with the pre-existing framework the IRS
had in place to deal with such tax fraud issues.38 The FCA filled
a gap where federal agencies did not exist. 39 However, no such
gap exists for tax issues, as the IRS serves this function. 40 And
not only did the IRS have expertise regarding these tax issues,
but this exemption would allow the IRS commissioner to control
all actions for the collection of internal revenue, leading to a de-
sired consistency that would likely not arise from letting the
various federal district and circuit courts handle the issues.
41
Furthermore, this exclusion is consistent with the Federal Tax
Code itself, which provides that "[n]o civil action for the collec-
tion or recovery of taxes, or of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture,
shall be commenced unless the Secretary authorizes or sanctions
the proceedings and the Attorney General or his delegate directs
that the action be commenced." 42
Most people regard the 1986 amendments as a success, as
the FCA now allows relators to bring suits to cut into the fraud
against the government without giving them opportunities to
bring parasitic suits. 43 On their website, the Taxpayers Against
Fraud show that as of October 1, 2007, qui tam suits have led to
more than twenty billion dollars in awards. 44 Over thirty differ-
ent relators have collected claims totaling over $100 million, with
one claim reaching $900 million. 45
38 See Fallon v Accudyne Corp, 880 F Supp 636, 639 (W D Wis 1995).
39 See Raspanti, 71 Temp L Rev 23, 24 (noting Lincoln's purpose for encouraging the
passage of the FCA) (cited in note 8).
40 Furthermore, the IRS has its own "rewards for information" program. Although it
is not a qui tam provision, this program "compensates informants for information they
provide identifying tax fraud," and "rewards are paid according to a discretionary reward
schedule based on the value of the information provided." Isaac B. Rosenberg, Raising the
Hue ... And Crying: Do False Claims Act Qui Tam Relators Act under Color of Federal
Law?, 37 Pub Con L J 271, 294 (2008).
41 Fallon, 880 F Supp at 639 ("Since such fraud is directly addressed and remedied by
the Internal Revenue Code it follows that Congress would not intend to duplicate those
remedies with an FCA claim arising from the identical conduct.").
42 26 USC § 7401 (2000).
43 Springfield Terminal Railway v Quinn, 14 F3d 645, 651 (DC Cir 1994) (discussing
repeated Congressional efforts to balance the encouraging of whistleblowing while dis-
couraging opportunistic behavior).
44 See The False Claims Act Legal Center, FY 2007 False Claims Act Settlements,
available at <http://www.taf.org/total2007.htm> (last visited Apr 8, 2008).
45 These numbers are the total amount of money paid back to the government, not
just the relators' shares. See The False Claims Act Legal Center, List of Top 20 Cases,
available at <http://www.taf.org/top20.htm> (last visited Apr 8, 2008) (The Taxpayers
Against Fraud website describes the settlement between Tenet Healthcare and the Fed-
eral Government in which Tenet Healthcare "agreed to pay the Federal Government $900
459
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D. The Post-1986 FCA: Procedures and Problems
1. Procedures.
Qui tam actions begin when a private person brings "a civil
action for a violation of [the FCA]" on behalf of "the person and
for the United States Government." 46 The relator must give the
government "a copy of the complaint and written disclosure of
substantially all material evidence and information" related to
the case.47 The Government then has sixty days in which to take
one of three actions. 48 First, it may "proceed with the action, in
which case the action shall be conducted by the Government." 49
Second, it may "notify the court that it declines to take over the
action, in which case the person bringing the action shall have
the right to conduct the action."50 Third, the Government may
dismiss the action with the written consent of the court and the
Attorney General. 51
Although the private party formally remains a party to the
suits in which the Government takes control, the private party's
power in such cases is very limited. 52 The Government may dis-
miss the action over any objections from the private party, as
long as it gives the person notice and an opportunity for a hear-
ing.53 The Government has the power to settle the action over
any objections from the private party, as long as it determines
through a hearing that "the proposed settlement is fair, ade-
quate, and reasonable under all the circumstances." 54 Also, in
million for billing violations that include manipulation of outlier payments to Medicare,
as well as kickbacks, upcoding, and bill padding.").
46 31 USC § 3730(b)(1) ("A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section
3729 for the person and for the United States Government. The action shall be brought in
the name of the Government.".
4' 31 USC § 3730(b)(2).
48 Id.
49 31 USC § 3730(b)(4).
50 Id.
51 Id. (' The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give
written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting."). For an explanation of
the general standard a court uses when deciding whether to dismiss a qui tam action at
the Government's request, see Timothy Stoltzfus Jost and Sharon L. Davies, Symposium:
Health Care Fraud: Past, Present and Future; The Empire Strikes Back: A Critique of the
Backlash against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 Ala L Rev 239, 317 (1999) (noting
that "the standard is whether the government's dismissal is 'reasonable,' i.e., [whether] it
bear[s] a rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose").
52 31 USC § 3730(c)(1).
53 31 USC § 3730(c)(2)(A).
54 31 USC § 3730(c)(2)(B).
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some circumstances, the Government may "impose limitations on
the person's participation" by limiting things such as "the num-
ber of witnesses the person may call" and "the length of the tes-
timony of such witnesses." 55 Similarly, if the defendant shows
that participation by the private person "would be for the pur-
poses of harassment or would cause the defendant undue burden
or unnecessary expense," the Government may limit the person's
participation. 56
If the Government neither proceeds with the action nor dis-
misses the action, the person may proceed on his or her own,
though the court may allow government intervention in the case
at a later date.57 Regardless of the Government's decision
whether or not to intervene, if discovery in the action interferes
with "the investigation or prosecution of a criminal or civil mat-
ter arising out of the same facts, the court may stay such discov-
ery" for up to sixty days. 58 Furthermore, the Government may
"pursue its claim through any alternate remedy available." 59 The
individual's rights remain the same in any alternate proceeding
as they would have been had the action continued as instituted. 60
The amount an individual stands to receive through a suc-
cessful action depends upon both the individual's and the Gov-
ernment's level of involvement. If the Government remains in-
volved, the individual receives "at least 15 percent but not more
than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action ... depending upon
the extent to which the persona substantially contributed." 61 If
the court finds that the action is "based primarily on disclosures
of specific information" not provided by the individual, the indi-
vidual may receive at most 10 percent of the proceeds. 62 If the
Government was not involved in the action, and assuming the
person bringing the action did not plan or initiate the violation at
hand, the individual will receive between 25 and 30 percent of
any proceeds. 63
55 31 USC § 3730(c)(2)(C)(i)-(ii).
56 31 USC § 3730(c)(2)(D).
57 31 USC § 3730(c)(3).
58 31 USC § 3730(c)(4).
59 31 USC § 3730(c)(5).
60 Id.
61 31 USC § 3730(d)(1).
62 31 USC § 3730(d)(1) (This section provides a list of the types of specific information
to which it refers: information "relating to allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil,
or administrative hearing, in a congressional administrative, or Government Accounting
Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media.").
63 31 USC § 3730(d)(3)-(4).
453]
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2. Statutory ambiguities.
The statute provides that relators cannot bring a qui tam ac-
tion "based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transac-
tions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congres-
sional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office report,
hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless
... the person bringing the action is an original source of the in-
formation." 64 Understanding what types of actions relators can
bring requires, however, understanding how courts have inter-
preted those restrictive words. The case law reveals that three
fundamental questions arise when considering a possible qui tam
action in light of the above statutory language. First, what con-
stitutes a public disclosure? Second, when is a qui tam action
"based upon the public disclosure"? And third, who can serve as
an original source?
a) Interpretations of "public disclosures." The text of the
statute itself sheds light on interpreting "public disclosures." The
text states that "public disclosures" include "allegations or trans-
actions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a con-
gressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office re-
port, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media."65
Courts have consistently found that anything beyond those items
on the above list are not public disclosures. 66
However, despite this "exhaustive rendition of the possible
sources," courts still face difficult inquiries over what constitutes
a publicly disclosed fact. 67 This problem arises in part because
"Congress gave [ ] little specific guidance to determine the scope
of the [listed] public disclosure sources." 68 For instance, the court
in Dunleavy v County of Delaware grappled with the scope of
"administrative 
... reports."69 How broad did Congress intend
64 31 USC § 3730(e)(4)(A).
65 Id.
66 See, for example, Dunleavy v Delaware, 123 F3d 734, 746 (3d Cir 1997) (stating
that the statutory definition of public disclosure does not include reports created by a
local government agency); Doe, 960 F2d at 323 ("Section 3730(e)(4)(A) furnishes an exclu-
sive list of the ways in which a public disclosure must occur for the jurisdictional bar to
apply."); LeBlanc v Raytheon Co, Inc, 913 F2d 17, 20 (1st Cir 1990) (section 3730(e)(4)(A)
"does not deny jurisdiction over actions based on disclosures other than those specified").
But see Fine v Advanced Sciences, Inc, 99 F3d 1000, 1004 (10th Cir 1996) (holding that
Section 3730(e)(4)(A) "defines the sources of allegations and transactions which trigger
the bar but.., does not define the only means by which public disclosure can occur").
67 Dunleavy, 123 F3d at 744.
68 Id at 745.
69 Id.
462 [2008:
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this language to stretch?70 Was this language meant to include
non-federal government administrative reports? 71 Even with the
exhaustive list of sources, the court noted the unlikelihood that
"Congress intended the public disclosures bar to be invoked
without limitation."72 So the important question becomes: what
are the limitations?
To answer this question, courts have set up a two-step in-
quiry to help determine whether the information is publicly dis-
closed.73 First, courts ask "whether the source is one recognized
by the Act." 74 Answering this question often involves using stan-
dard canons of construction to ask whether the information at
hands fits into one of the listed categories. 75 Second, courts ask
"whether the extent of disclosure is sufficient to support the con-
clusion that the information contained therein is now public
within the meaning of the Act. ' 76 This inquiry depends upon the
type of information at issue, and a survey of the totality of the
circumstances surrounding any disclosure often answers this
inquiry. 77
b) Interpretations of "based upon." Further ambiguities arise
when courts consider whether a qui tam action is "based upon
the public disclosure." 78 Some courts allow suits by relators with
personal knowledge of fraudulent behavior, irrespective of the
fact that the fraud has been publicly disclosed. 79 For them, the
critical question is whether the relator's knowledge came from
the public disclosure or some other source.80
70 Id.
71 Dunleavy, 123 F3d at 744.
72 Id at 745.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See, for example, Dunleavy, 123 F3d at 745 (noting that "Congress gave [the court]
little specific guidance to determine the scope of public disclosure sources" before using
the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, which uses the surrounding words to inform a word's
meaning)
76 Id at 744.
77 See, for example, Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, PA v Prudential Ins Co,
944 F2d 1149, 1158-60 (3d Cir 1991) (considering things like the potential accessibility of
certain types of information).
78 31 USC § 3730(e)(4)(A).
79 See, for example, Siller v Becton Dickinson & Co, 21 F3d 1339, 1348 (4th Cir 1994)
("Rather plainly, therefore, a relator's action is 'based upon' a public disclosure of allega-
tions only where the relator has actually derived from that disclosure the allegations
upon which his qui tam action is based.").
80 Id (noting that based upon' means 'derived from').
463
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For example, in Siller v Becton Dickinson,81 the relator was
an employee of SSI. SSI was a distributor of products manufac-
tured by Becton Dickinson ("BD"). 82 Through this distributor-
ship, the relator learned that BD overcharged the government
for certain goods. 83 This information, however, was also included
in publicly available documents related to a previous suit be-
tween SSI and BD. 84 BD attempted to dismiss the relator's ac-
tion, claiming that it was "based upon publicly disclosed allega-
tions."8 5
The Fourth Circuit decided that "based upon" means "de-
rived from." 86 Thus, even though the settlement between SSI and
BD included the very same information contained in the relator's
suit, the fact that the relator did not get his information from
those settlement documents meant that his action was not based
upon the public disclosure. 87 The Fourth Circuit noted that a
"straightforward textual exegesis" of the phrase "based upon"
means "to use as a basis for."8 8 And since the relator's employ-
ment relationship, and not the settlement, was the basis for his
claim, his claim was not based upon, or derived from, public in-
formation.89
Other courts throw out claims whenever a public disclosure
contained the relator's information, even if the relator did not
rely on that disclosure to bring the suit. 90 In Doe v John Doe
Corp, the Second Circuit held that a relator's action is "based
upon" a public disclosure whenever the allegations are "the same
as those that ha[ve] been publicly disclosed ... regardless of
where the relator obtained his information."91
A third line of analysis used by courts relates to situations
where a relator brings multiple claims at once, some of which are
based upon public information, while other claims are based
upon information uncovered by the relator's own work and inves-
81 Siller, 21 F3d at 1340-41.
82 Id.
83 Id at 1341.
84 Id at 1341. SSI had sued BD for wrongful termination of the distributorship. SSI
claimed that BD had terminated the distributorship because BD feared SSI would dis-
close that BD overcharged the government.
85 Siller, 21 F3d at 1340.
86 Id at 1347-48.
87 Id at 1348.
88 Id.
89 Siller, 21 F3d at 1348.
90 See, for example, Doe, 960 F2d 318 (2d Cir 1992).
91 Id at 324.
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tigation. In Federal Recovery Services, Inc v United States, the
relator alleged that an emergency medical services company
submitted fraudulent claims for reimbursement for ambulance
services received by individuals who were not eligible for them. 92
The relator alleged multiple instances of fraud, one of which was
the same instance alleged in a prior complaint available to the
public. 93 In dismissing the claim, the Fifth Circuit followed the
Tenth Circuit's prior holding that "an FCA qui tam action even
partly based upon public disclosed allegations or transactions is
nonetheless 'based upon' such allegations or transaction." 94 Thus,
even though the relator provided some original work leading to
some of the claims, the relator could not recover.
c) The meaning of "original source." The questions of
whether the claim is based upon a public disclosure are irrele-
vant if the relator is an original source. 95 The text of the FCA
itself lends a hand in interpreting "original source" in 31 USC
§ 3730(e)(4)(B). The statute defines the term as "an individual
who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on
which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the
information to the Government before filing an action under this
section which is based on the information."' 96
Despite the guidance offered by this definition, ambiguity
still exists, as different circuit courts differ in their interpreta-
tion of the meaning of "original source." Cooper v Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Florida97 provides a good example of the dis-
agreement across circuits. The Eleventh Circuit notes that it dis-
agrees with the Second Circuit's interpretation of who consti-
tutes an original source. 98 The Second Circuit requires that rela-
tors be able to prove they were the original source "to the entity
that disclosed the allegations."99 The Eleventh Circuit makes no
92 See, for example, Federal Recovery Services, Inc v United States, 72 F3d 447, 451
(5th Cir 1995) (barring a suit based in part on a public disclosure, even though the relator
added other "substantively identical" claims to the suit).
93 Id.
94 Id, citing Precision Co v Koch Industries, Inc, 971 F2d 548, 552 (10th Cir 1993)
(second emphasis added).
95 Doe, 960 F2d 318, 322 n 3 (noting that "[elven if a relator's claim is based upon
allegations or transactions that were publicly disclosed ... the action is not jurisdiction-
ally barred if the relator is an 'original source"').
96 31 USC § 3730(e)(4)(B).
97 19 F3d 562 (11th Cir 1994).
98 Id at 568 n 13 (noting that "[w]e are unable to agree with the Second Circuit's
opinion that the relator must also prove he was the original source of the information').
99 Dick v Long Island Lighting Co, 912 F2d 13, 17 (2d Cir 1990).
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such requirement, and further does not even require that an
original source possess all the relevant information independ-
ently. 100
Quite recently, the Supreme Court acknowledged difficulties
with this original source question in Rockwell International Corp
v United States.10 1 The Court noted that the original source
"question is hardly free from doubt," and is one that provides
"textual ambiguity."10 2 However, the Court did not in that deci-
sion resolve all questions regarding original source questions. 0 3
III. STATE FALSE CLAIMS ACTS
The 1986 amendments to the FCA made it a much more
powerful tool in fighting fraud against the government. 0 4 Per-
haps due to the success this more powerful FCA had in combat-
ing fraud against the federal government, many states began
enacting their own versions to encourage similar policing of
frauds perpetrated against state governmental agencies. 0 5 Cali-
fornia became the first state to pass a false claims act. It passed
the California False Claims Act in 1987,106 just after the 1986
FCA amendments passed. 107 The federal government encouraged
more states to pass false claims acts in its Deficit Reduction Act
of 2005. This Act gave states a 10 percent increase in Medicaid-
fraud recoveries if they passed false claims acts that met certain
enumerated qualifications. 0 8 As of 2007, California, Delaware,
the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indi-
100 Id.
101 127 S Ct 1397 (2007).
102 Id at 1407-08.
103 See, for example, Carolyn V. Metnick, The Jurisdictional Bar Provision: Who Is an
Appropriate Relator? 17 Annals Health L 101, 104 (2008) (noting that although the deci-
sion provides clarity to some conditions, "a number of other conditions of... the original
source exception ... remain unclear).
104 Tipton F. McCubbins and Tara I. Fitzgerald, As False Claims Penalties Mount,
Defendants Scramble for Answers; Qui Tam Liability, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq., 62 BusLaw
103, 106 (2006).
105 R. Harrison Smith, A Key Time for Qui Tam: The False Claims Act and Alabama,
58 Ala L Rev 1199, 1207 (2006-07).
106 Cal Gov Code § 12652 (West 2000).
107 James F. Barger, Jr. et al, States, Statutes, and Fraud: An Empirical Study of
Emerging State False Claims Acts, 80 Tul L Rev 465, 479 (2005).
108 42 USCA § 1396h(a) (West 2007) ("Notwithstanding section 1369d(b) of this title, if
a State has in effect a law relating to false or fraudulent claims that meets the require-
ments of subsection (b), the Federal medical assistance percentage with respect to any
amounts recovered under a State action brought under such law, shall be decreased by 10
percentage points.").
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ana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hamp-
shire, New Mexico, New York, Nevada, Oklahoma, Tennessee,
Texas, and Virginia all had their own false claims statutes. 109
Most states have passed their false claims acts since 2000.110
A. Similarities with the FCA
Because states modeled their false claims acts after the
FCA, the state false claims acts closely resemble the Federal
FCA. 111 Not only do the acts forbid essentially the same things,
but they use nearly identical language in doing so. 112 Moreover,
the state statutes set up nearly identical procedural frameworks
for qui tam actions. 113 For instance, all state statutes allow the
government to intervene in the case and serve as a co-plaintiff
with the relator.114 Similarly, all statutes allow states to monitor
the suit, even if the state refrains from adding itself as a plain-
tiff.115 Most importantly for the current analysis, all state stat-
utes allow reverse false claims, doing so with language identical
or nearly identical with that used in the FCA.116 Further, all of
109 See The False Claims Act Legal Center, State False Claims Acts <http://www.taf.
org/statefca.htm> (last visited on Apr 12, 2008) (interactive map).
110 Smith, 58 Ala L Rev at 1207 (cited in note 105).
111 Barger et al, 80 Tul L Rev 465 (cited in note 107) (citing a survey of state attorneys
general who responded to a phone survey consisting of several specific questions about
their states' false claims acts); Smith, 58 Ala L Rev at 1207 (cited in note 105) (listing
similarities between state and federal false claims acts).
112 Compare 31 USC § 3729(a) (making liable "[a]ny person who ... knowingly pre-
sents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Govern-
ment or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent claim
for payment or approval"), with 740 ILCS 175/3(a) (West 2007) (making liable "[a]ny
person who... knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of
the State or a member of the Guard a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval").
Other state statutes bear similar resemblances. See, for example, Cal Gov Code
§ 12651(a)(1) (West 2007) (making liable "[a]ny person who ... [k]knowingly presents or
causes to be presented to an officer or employee of the state or of any political subdivision
thereof, a false claim for payment or approval").
113 Smith, 58 Ala L Rev at 1207 (cited in note 105).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Compare 31 USC § 3729(a) (making liable "[any person who... knowingly makes,
uses or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or de-
crease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government") with 740
ILCS 175/3(a) (making liable "[any person who ... knowingly makes, uses, or causes to
be made or used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid or decrease an obligation to
pay or transmit money or property to the State"). Other state statutes bear similar re-
semblances. See, for example, Cal Gov Code § 12651(a)(7) (West 2007) (making liable
"[a]ny person who ... [k]knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used a false
record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money
or property to the state or to any political subdivision".
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the state statutes include language barring suits brought with
public information, unless the relator was the original source,
just as the FCA does. 117
Since many of these state false claims acts are "virtually
identical" in language to the Federal FCA, they have encoun-
tered the same interpretive problems that arise under the
FCA.l" 8 Furthermore, as states have passed their false claims
acts much more recently than Congress passed the Federal FCA,
the state courts often face these questions with little if any state
case law that speaks to them. 119 And while some state courts
have inserted their own lines of analysis into these qui tam ac-
tions, most state courts have relied heavily on the well-
established body of federal law when analyzing these ques-
tions. 120
Not surprisingly, California, as the first state to pass a false
claims act, doing so in 1987 after the 1986 amendments to the
FCA, has the most case law on the subject. 121 This body of case
law bears great resemblance to the federal law on the subject.
For instance, California cases express the same general underly-
ing theory of when to allow or disallow a qui tam action, noting
that "the California [false claims] statute was intended to limit
the availability of qui tam actions so as to protect against 'oppor-
tunistic' or 'parasitic' actions."'122 This language fits very well
with some of that used in federal cases after Congress passed the
1986 amendments to the Federal FCA. 123
Other cases note the parallel in language and purpose be-
tween state and the Federal FCA, and they rely on these simi-
larities to perform lengthier analyses very similar to those per-
formed in federal courts when analyzing the meaning of "public
117 See, for example, 740 ILCS 175/4(e)(4)(A) (West 2007) (barring actions "unless the
action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original
source of the information.").
118 Beeler, Schad and Diamond, PC v Target Corp, 856 NE2d 1096, 1102 (1ll App
2006). See Part II D 2 for a discussion of these problems.
119 Beeler, Schad and Diamond, PC v Target Corp, 856 NE2d 1096, 1102 (111 App
2006) (noting that Illinois courts have not looked to the specific questions, "[h]owever, the
federal courts have interpreted [the relevant section] of the federal False Claims Act").
120 Id (noting that "[blecause the language in the [Federal] FCA is virtually identical
to the language in the [State] Act, in order to understand the [State] Act, we review fed-
eral cases which have examined and analyzed the [Federal] FCA").
121 Barger et al, 80 Tul L Rev at 479 (cited in note 107).
122 Metz v CCC Information Services, Inc, 149 Cal App 4th 402, 420 (2007), citing
Allstate Insurance Co v Weitzman, 107 Cal App 4th 534, 564 (2003).
123 See, for example, Doe, 960 F2d at 321 (discussing the transition to the 1986
amendments in light of a paradigmatic "parasitic action").
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disclosure," "based upon a public disclosure," and "original
source." 124 For instance, Grayson v Pacific Bell Telephone Co
looks closely at the meaning of "original source" and "public dis-
closure," and in doing so relies heavily on federal precedents. 125
Even in what seems like a new interpretation of some statutory
language in Grayson-when the court holds that "news media"
include scholarly or scientific periodicals-the court reaches that
decision by relying on a federal precedent that included govern-
ment reports in "news media." 126
Overall, the little bit of case law that addresses some of the
issues common to those in Federal FCA cases indicates that
when state courts face the same or similar questions that federal
courts have already answered regarding the Federal FCA, states
will look to those federal decisions for guidance, and they often
keep their rulings in line with federal precedent. Also, even when
state courts must answer new or unique questions, they usually
do so with federal precedent as a starting point. 127 The states
first passed false claims actions heavily relying on the federal
model, and now are slowly building a body of case law based on
those cases stemming from their original federal model. Any de-
parture from federal precedent would be inconsistent with the
development of the statutes and case law thus far.
B. Differences with the FCA
The main difference between the Federal FCA and some
state false claims act is that some state false claims acts do not
expressly exempt tax issues. 128 Such omissions of tax exemp-
tions, especially when the rest of the act bears a close resem-
blance to the Federal FCA, which expressly exempts such tax
claims, strongly suggest that state legislatures that did not ex-
pressly exempt tax claims desired to permit them through their
124 See, for example, Grayson v Pacific Bell Telephone Co, 142 Cal App 4th 741, 748
(2006) (citing both federal and state cases when discussing when a qui tam action is
barred).
125 Id at 755.
126 Id at 751, citing Findley, 105 F3d at 686.
127 Courts tend to use federal guidance from the federal courts that encompass their
jurisdiction. See, for example, Beeler, 367 Ill App 3d at 865 (citing the Seventh Circuit
when reasoning that, "[blecause the language in the FCA is virtually identical to the
language in the Act, in order to understand the Illinois Act, we review federal cases which
have examined and analyzed the FCA").
128 See, for example, Nev Rev Stat § 357 (2007).
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false claims act. 129 The Supreme Court of Nevada made this ob-
servation, noting that:
Nevada's FCA, in stark contrast to the federal legislation
after which it was modeled, includes language allowing
reverse false claims but omits any provision barring per-
sons from bringing false claims actions based on tax li-
abilities. Thus, facially and otherwise, the inclusion of
"obligations" within the FCA's scope, coupled with the
omission of an express tax bar, conclusively demonstrates
the Legislature's intent to include tax liability matters
within the realm of possible false claims. 130
Although in International Game Technology, Inc v Second
Jud D Court, the Nevada Supreme Court did go on to hold that
the state tax department should deal with the issues at hand, the
conclusion of the decision notes that a "false claims action involv-
ing allegations that by reference incorporate the revenue stat-
utes is not necessarily excluded from the realm of permissible
claims under the Nevada FCA."'131
IV. INTERNET SALES AND Qui TAM ACTIONS
This recent growth in the number of state false claims acts
indicates that states are getting more serious about addressing
issues of being overcharged and underpaid. 132 A huge area of lost
revenue for states is taxes never collected and remitted on re-
mote sales, especially internet sales. 133 Thus, if these false claims
acts are to be most useful in reducing tax fraud in this area of
internet sales, the key question is whether qui tam actions can
129 International Game, 127 P3d at 1104 (noting that "the inclusion of 'obligations'
within the FCA's scope, coupled with the omission of an express tax bar, conclusively
demonstrates the Legislature's intent to include tax liability matters within the realm of
possible false claims").
130 Id.
131 Id at 1108.
132 Smith, 58 Ala L Rev at 1207 (cited in note 105) ("Mhe greatest concentration of
state false claims acts have been passed since the year 2000.").
133 See, for example, Jennifer Ballantonio, E-commerce firms shrug off new plans to
tax internet sales, available at <http://fmdarticles.comlp/articles/mi m5072is_50_25/
ai_1 11617677> (last visited Apr 12, 2008) ("California loses $1.2 billion annually in uncol-
lected use tax, the bulk of which is via e-commerce."). California does require consumers
to pay use tax, and admits that it loses money to uncollected use taxes because of en-
forcement issues. See Legislative Analysts Office, California's Tax System: A Primer,
available at <http://www.lao.ca.gov/2001/taxprimer/0101-taxprimer-chapter3.html>
(last visited Apr 12, 2008).
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be a successful tool in reducing this level of unpaid taxes. In set-
ting up an answer to this question, this Part explains the basic
mechanics of taxing remote sales, shows the importance of inter-
net sales to state revenues, and describes the distinct role inter-
net purchases play.
A. The Mechanics of Taxing Remote Sales
Understanding how a basic internet purchase can lead to a
qui tam action requires a basic understanding of how a remote
purchase can lead to state taxation in the first place. Most states
levy a sales tax. Such taxes are imposed on almost all purchases
of tangible personal property purchased in a state, as well as on
many purchases of services within a state. 34 For instance, when
a purchaser goes into a store in Illinois and buys a soft drink, the
seller adds a 6.25 percent state sales tax onto the purchase. 135
However, states may not apply sales tax to interstate trans-
actions. Such a tax amounts to taxing interstate commerce,
which conflicts with the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. 136 If no such comparable tax were added to goods
ordered over the internet or through the mail, such a taxation
system would tend to favor out-of-state purchases.137 In response
to this inequality and in an effort to protect their in-state sellers,
many states enacted what is called a use tax. Use taxes, as their
name suggests, tax the use of the goods in the state rather than
the purchase of the goods outside the state. 38 The use tax serves
to complement the sales tax; typically transactions are subject to
a sales or use tax, but not to both.139 Use taxation both raises
revenue and protects local retailers who are subject to the usual
sales tax. 140
134 BNA Tax Management Portfolios, State Series, Sales and Use Tax,
TMSTATEPORT No 1300 § 13 (2008).
135 See <http://tax.illinois.gov/Businesses/TaxInformation/Sales/rot.htm> (last visited
Apr 12, 2008).
136 See McLeod v JE Dilworth Co, 322 US 327, 330-31 (1944) (affirming that "the
Commerce Clause precludes liability for the sales tax of that State").
137 Certainly other costs of out-of-state purchases might be higher, such as shipping
and handling charges, but the purchases would at least be favored from a tax perspective.
138 See <http://tax.illinois.govlBusinesses/TaxInformation/Sales/rot.htm> (last visited
Apr 12, 2008) (detailing Illinois sales and use tax).
139 United Air Lines, Inc v Mahin, 410 US 623, 638 (1973) ('The use tax came into
being to complement the sales tax, i.e., to fill in gaps where the States could not constitu-
tionally tax interstate arrivals or departures.").
140 William Meade Fletcher, Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations, 18A
Fletcher Cyc Corp § 8817.30 (2007) ("[Ihe purpose of such a tax, in addition to raising
revenue, is to protect local retailers who must collect a sales tax from unfavorable compe-
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As a technical matter, the purchaser bears the burden of
paying both sales and use tax. 141 However, collecting such taxes
from purchasers is impractical. Thus, the burden of collecting
sales taxes has traditionally been placed on sellers, who collect
and remit the tax to the state. However, the Supreme Court has
held in the sales tax context that imposing this collection duty on
out-of-state sellers violates the Commerce Clause. 142 There is
little doubt that they would hold similarly when it comes to use
taxes. Stated simply, if a seller lacks physical presence in a state,
it cannot be made to collect either a sales or use tax on behalf of
the state.
However, this Quill standard leaves open what constitutes
physical presence, and requirements differ from state to state. 143
Illinois, for example, says that a retailer satisfies this physical
presence if a purchaser can return the item purchased to a store
somewhere in the state. 144 Other factors, such as a retailer's di-
rect physical presence in a jurisdiction, the physical presence of
an affiliate, or the presence of an agent or representative of the
retailer, come into play for some states when determining
whether there is an obligation to collect and remit a tax. 145
These issues of nexus are complicated and differ across
states, but the basic idea is simple: if a remote seller has suffi-
cient physical presence within a state, that state can require the
remote retailer to collect sales or use taxes due from customers
within that state. In this way, if an internet seller has the ap-
propriate nexus with a state, the sale of goods to people within
tition with untaxed retailers in other states.").
141 BNA Tax Management Portfolios, State Series, Sales and Use Tax,
TMSTATEPORT No 1300 § 13 (2008).
142 Quill Corp v Heitkamp, 504 US 298 (1992).
143 Annette Nellen, Nexus Confusion: Sales and Use Tax, available at <http:/!
www.cpa2biz.com/Contentlmedia/PRODUCER-CONTENT/Newsletters/Articles_2007/Cor
pTax/UseTax.jsp> (last visited May 10, 2008) ("rules differ from state to state, are not
always clear and interpretations continue to evolve").
144 Robert Guy Matthews, Online Retailer Skips Sales Tax? You Might Sue, available
at <http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB112924792244868264-tMx7xjZSaV89CMWg9q
kxcX0d3s_20061014.html> (last visited May 10, 2008) ("In Illinois, a retailer is consid-
ered to have a physical presence if a customer can return an item purchased online to a
retailer's physical location.").
145 For examples of cases discussing some fundamental issues behind levying use
taxes, see Associated Industries of Missouri v Lohman, 511 US 641, 647-48 (1994) (dis-
cussing the Commerce Clause's impact on levying a use tax); Railcar, Ltd v Southern
Illinois Railcar Co, 42 F Supp 2d 1369, 1379-80 (N D Ga 1999) (discussing the minimum
contacts required for a state to be able to levy a use tax).
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that state requires the internet seller to collect use taxes in rela-
tion to those purchases. 146
B. The Distinct Role of Internet Sales
Internet purchases provide a distinct and critically impor-
tant example of remote sales where use taxes may apply. This
issue of use taxes on internet purchases is of critical importance
for several reasons. It is incontrovertible that internet sales have
grown and continue to grow at impressive rates. 147 Not only has
the pure dollar amount of sales grown, but the number of people
making purchases online has grown. 148 This growth has im-
pacted the retail sales landscape in two main ways. First, inter-
net sales have grown to the point where they outnumber all
other sources of remote sales, including mail- and telephone-
order sales. 149 Second, internet sales continue to make up an in-
creasing portion of retail sales overall. 150 This trend has per-
sisted even in the face of a slowing economy, where many sectors
of the retail market experience falling sales, but online pur-
chases continue to increase.151
Further, this growth of internet sales has coincided with the
emergence of state false claims acts; "the greatest concentration
of state false claims acts have been passed since the year
2000."152 By that time internet sales were well into their trend of
healthy and consistent growth. 5 3 This timing is important not
only because a growth in internet sales may very well coincide
146 Whether the sellers are collecting use taxes is another issue.
147 See, for example, Kurt Peters, Doing the Math, available at <http://www.
internetretailer.com/internet/marketing-conference/10724-doing-math.html> (last visited,
May 10, 2008) (demonstrating the growth of internet sales as a portion of both remote
sales and retail sales in general).
148 See, for example, Online Buying Grows, But How Much?, available at
<http://www.emarketer.com/Article.aspx?id=1005942&src=articlel-home> (last visited,
May 10, 2008) ('The number of US consumers who have purchased online more than
doubled from 22% in June 2000 to 49% in September 2007.").
149 Precise data on this issue are hard to find. Many sources, however, indicate this to
be the case. See, for example, US Census Bureau E-Stats, (May 25, 2007) available at
<http://www.census.gov/eos/www/2005/2005reportfinal.pdf> (last visited May 10, 2008).
150 See, for example, Peters, Doing the Math (cited in note 147) (demonstrating the
growth of internet sales as a portion of both remote sales and retail sales in general).
151 See, for example, Cheryl Lu-Lien Tan, Retail Sales Fall in Some Categories But
Surge Online, MasterCard Says, available at <http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB119989825758778245.html> (last visited May 10, 2008).
152 Smith, 58 Ala L Rev at 1207 (cited in note 105).
153 See, for example, Peters, Doing the Math (cited in note 147) (demonstrating the
growth of internet sales as a portion of both remote sales and retail sales in general).
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with a growth in avoided use tax collection,15 4 but also because
the growth in sales increases the incentives for a relator to bring
a qui tam action. So as internet sales grew, tools for purchasers
to use against tax avoiding retailers were developing.
There are two reasons why the amount of sales in a certain
area is directly proportional to the probability that a relator will
bring a qui tam action in that area, and also directly proportional
to the amount a qui tam relator stands to recover if successful.
First, and more importantly, the higher the amount of sales, the
more money there is at stake. This is a huge piece, since the
amount of money at stake is directly proportional to the award a
qui tam plaintiff stands to receive, which directly affects the
plaintiff's decision of whether or not it is worthwhile to initiate a
suit. Second, the more sales there are, the more likely there will
be some wrongdoing. If the probability of tax evasion occurring in
a transaction is given by P, and the number of transactions is
given by T, then the number of occurrences of wrongdoing is the
product of P and T. As T rises, which is the case here, then the
number of transactions involving wrongdoing increases. Thus, as
internet sales continue to grow, the more important issues sur-
rounding use tax collection and qui tam suits involving internet
retailers become.
The importance of the issue of internet taxation is further
evidenced by the amount of attention the legal and business
worlds give to the subject. 155 State legislators are concerned with
the amount of money their states are losing to uncollected use
taxes, local businesses are concerned with losing business to un-
taxed internet retailers, and internet retailers are concerned
with how having to pay use taxes in the future will affect their
profitability. 156
154 See, for example, Bellantonio, E-commerce firms shrug off new plans (cited in note
133) ("California loses $1.2 billion annually in uncollected use tax, the bulk of which is via
e-commerce."). California does require consumers to pay use tax, and admits that it loses
money to uncollected use taxes because of enforcement issues. See California's Tax Sys-
tem: A Primer (cited in note 133).
155 See, for example, Pamela Swidler, The Beginning of the End to a Tax-Free Internet:
Developing an E-Commerce Clause, 28 Cardozo L Rev 541, 543 (2006) ('The difficulties
involved in taxing remote sales... are far from novel. [And] the increasing use of the web
for transactions previously conducted in real space is cause for even greater confusion.
The Internet adds to these complexities by blurring both the geographic boundaries be-
tween states and the definitional boundaries between goods and services.") (footnotes and
internal quotations omitted).
156 See, generally, Leroy Baker, US Retailers Urge Congressional Action on Internet
Sales Taxes, available at <http://www.tax-news.com/asp/story/US-RetailersUrge-
CongressionalActionOn_Internet_salesTaxes_xxxx28500.html> (last visited May 10,
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Thus, for all of these reasons, as internet sales grow, which
in turn enhances the financial significance of internet sales, un-
derstanding how courts will handle issues of use tax evasion and
their relation to qui tam actions become increasingly important.
C. The Distinct Role of Internet Purchases
As indicated in Part IV A, above, not all internet purchases
give rise to taxes, and as such, only certain internet purchases
can lead to a whistleblower case for a use tax violation. A recent
New York Times article notes this well: "Buy the latest John
Grisham book at Barnes & Noble in Union Square in New York,
and you'll pay 8.375 percent sales tax. Buy it from Amazon and
you won't pay any tax. But order the same book from Barnes &
Noble's Web site, and you do pay the tax because any company
with operations in the state must collect [use] tax."157
So what does an internet transaction leading to a qui tam
action look like? A typical qui tam action arises when an online
customer in one state begins an online purchase transaction with
an online retailer. Often, at or near the end of such a transaction,
the website displays the amount of tax the company applies to
the purchase. If the company satisfies State X's requirements for
taxable nexus, then Company Y should be collecting tax from the
customer for the purchase. If the website shows that the retailer
is not collecting any taxes, the customer could collect this evi-
dence, and then use it to institute a suit on behalf of the state,
beginning the qui tam action. The question is whether such ac-
tions should succeed.
V. WHETHER AND WHEN AN INTERNET PURCHASER
CAN WIN A Qu TAM ACTION
Such actions have been brought, but to date, no internet pur-
chaser qui tam plaintiff has recovered on a tax-related claim.158
This Part examines why plaintiffs have lost, and argues for spe-
cific circumstances in which a plaintiff should win.
2008) ("The US National Retail Federation and nearly 100 retailers and trade associa-
tions are urging Congress to approve legislation making it easier to require internet mer-
chants, mail-order houses and other "remote sellers" to collect sales tax across state
lines.).
157 Saul Hansell, Amazon Plays Dumb in Internet Sales Tax Debate, available at
<http:/Ibits.blogs.nytimes.comJ2008/02/13/amazon-plays-dumb-in-internet-saes-tax-
debate> (last visited May 10, 2008).
158 See, for example, Beeler, Schad & Diamond, PC v Ritz Camera Centers, Inc, 878
NE2d 1152, 1170 (111 2007).
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A. The "Knowingly" Hurdle
One hurdle that internet purchases face is showing that the
retailer knowingly made a false record or statement sufficient to
create liability under the relevant state false claims act. 159 This
hurdle has two parts. First, the relator must show that the re-
tailer was required to collect and remit use tax. That is, to show
that the record or statement is false, the plaintiff must know a
little bit about what is true-that is, whether, objectively speak-
ing, the retailer should have collected and remitted taxes. Sec-
ond, assuming a few things-that some tax requirement existed,
that the retailer failed to collect and remit the tax, and that the
relator can show this-the relator must show that the retailer
knowingly failed to collect and remit the tax. It is not enough
that the retailer made a mistake with the amount of tax col-
lected. The retailer must have knowingly submitted a false re-
cord or made a false statement.
Beeler, Schad & Diamond, PC v Ritz Camera Centers, Inc 60
provides a nice example of these two requirements. In Ritz, the
qui tam plaintiff had records from the online retailer that
showed that the retailer had collected no use tax. 161 The qui tam
plaintiff claimed this was fraudulent, and wanted to recover
these taxes on the state's behalf, and take a portion of the
claim. 162 The court dismissed the action, noting that a "remote
retailer cannot make a 'knowingly' false record or statement to
create liability under the" Illinois Whistleblower Reward and
Protection Act if it "disclosed that no use tax [was] due or col-
lected based on the taxpayer's reasonable interpretation of the
law."163
The court concluded that if reasonable parties may disagree
about the underlying tax issue, a record regarding the taxes as-
159 This idea of knowingly making a false claim or record is one embodied in the Fed-
eral FCA, and was adopted by the states when they passed their state false claims acts.
Compare 31 USC § 3729(a)(7) (making someone liable who "knowingly makes, uses, or
causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an
obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government") with 740 ILCS
175/3(a)(7) (West 2007) (making someone liable who "knowingly makes, uses, or causes to
be made or used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid or decrease an obligation to
pay or transmit money or property to the State"). The only difference is between the word
"Government" and "State." Note even the section numbers are the same, which results
because of the similarity of the general structure of these false claims acts.
160 878 NE2d 1152 (111 2007).
161 Id at 1156.
162 Id.
163 Id at 1170.
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sociated or not associated with the disputed transactions cannot
be knowingly false. 164 The court held that the Act, under the spe-
cific facts in Ritz, "require[d] the existence of an actual record or
statement," and "documents memorializing a purchase that dis-
closes that no use tax is being collected cannot be considered
false sufficient to create liability under the Act."165 Furthermore,
"[s]ince falsity is synonymous with an untruth, 'expressions of
opinion, scientific judgments, or statements as to conclusions
about which reasonable minds may differ cannot be false."' 166
That is, if there is a confusing or complicated tax issue at the
heart of the relator's claim over which reasonable minds could
disagree, the retailer's failure to collect and remit tax could not
be a knowing violation of a tax law.167 Instead, the court noted
that the relator could have had a perfectly reasonable belief that
no tax should be collected, and hence the retailer did not know-
ingly reduce an obligation owed to the state. 168
Similar to the holding in International Game, the court in
Ritz did find that "the Act [does] appl[y] to alleged tax liabilities
under the Use Tax Act when fraudulent records and statements
exists [sic]."'1 69 The court does not provide a specific example of
where this may be the case, but presumably such an example
would involve a clearer tax issue which would make it possible
for sellers to falsify their records.
The hurdle becomes higher as courts, including those in In-
ternational Game and Ritz, have demonstrated concern in involv-
ing themselves at all with complicated tax issues. 170 Perhaps re-
lators could be bailed out in cases like Ritz if courts sorted
through the tax issues, but courts generally express that the
complex nature of tax claims makes these issues better-suited for
resolution through the state-created bodies that have experience
in dealing with them. 171 Not only can these state tax depart-
ments answer these questions with greater expertise, but in do-
164 Ritz, 878 NE2d at 1170.
165 Id.
166 Id at 1162, citing Maxwell v Kerr-McGee Chemical Worldwide, LLC, 2006 US Dist
LEXIS 73014, at *7 (D Colo 2006).
167 See Part II for a discussion of some of the difficulties in establishing that use taxes
must be collected on a remote sale.
168 Ritz, 878 NE2d at 1170.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 International Game, 127 P3d at 1108. ("As asserted by the Attorney General, these
are exactly the types of determinations better left to the tax department in order to pro-
mote consistency and uniformity.").
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ing so, they will likely hand down more consistent decisions and
make the body of tax law easier for subsequent parties to navi-
gate. 172 This expertise becomes even more important when the
case presents the initial question of whether any tax is due in the
first place, as was the case in Ritz. 173 The Illinois court said that
"a remote retailer cannot make a 'knowingly' false record or
statement sufficient to create liability under the Act when the
pertinent area of the law is unclear and specific factual analysis
must be completed." 174
These statements from the Ritz court address both parts of
the "knowingly" hurdle. To the first part, whether there is any
tax due, the court basically took a hands-off approach, saying
that that question was best left for others to decide. The court
then induced an answer to the second question from its answer
to the first. Given that the issue of whether taxes should have
been collected and remitted is difficult and ambiguous, and since
the retailer could have failed to collect and remit taxes based on
a reasonable understanding that the tax law did not require this
collection and remitting, the knowingly requirement is not
met. 175 Thus the hurdle becomes even higher for the relator,
since a complex issue implies an unfavorable answer for the rela-
tor.
Given this tall initial task that faces any relator, an impor-
tant question is whether a relator can ever meet it. Assuming
these online retailers are rational actors, it is logical to think
that, the clearer the tax issues, the less likely it will be for them
to neglect to collect and remit taxes. Put another way, the cases
that make it to court because a retailer did not collect use tax are
likely to involve the more complicated tax issues. 176 Thus, the
cases that make it to court might very well resemble Ritz and
International Game, and as such, might be dismissed because of
172 Id.
173 Ritz, 878 NE2d 1152.
174 Id at 1158.
175 Note that the court in Ritz did not consider whether the retailer knew or did not
know that taxes were due, but only said that it was reasonable for the retailer not to
know. Ritz, 878 NE2d at 1170. This is how the two issues-whether tax was due and
whether the retailer knew that-are intertwined. The complexity of the issues leads to a
reasonableness of confusion, and hence a lack of a knowing avoidance.
176 This works on two levels. First, if the retailer is purposefully trying to avoid taxes,
the retailer is wise to omit those taxes in complicated cases, since it is likely harder to
detect the wrongdoing, and the case law is on their side. Second, if the retailer is a good
faith actor, tautologically, it is more likely the retailer will make more mistakes in collect-
ing and remitting taxes when the tax issues are more complicated, for that is what it
means for the tax issues to be complicated.
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the complexity of the tax issues involved. So perhaps the right
conclusion is to say this hurdle is one that relators cannot over-
come, because the only times they will face it is when it is far too
high to clear.
Yet to conclude that because of possible difficulties, courts
cannot find that remote retailers can knowingly make, use, or
cause to be made or used, false records or statements that con-
ceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to the government, flies in
the face of what the courts have themselves said. For instance, in
International Game, while the Supreme Court of Nevada did not
give a specific example of a tax case that could properly be
brought under the state false claims act, the court clearly stated
that "private plaintiffs may properly bring false claims actions
based on tax deficiencies under some circumstances." 177 The
court in Ritz cited this point when discussing the interpretation
of the state false claims acts that do not specifically exempt tax
claims. 178
Given this language from the courts, there is another possi-
bility. Certainly situations exist where the tax issues involved
will not be ones where reasonable parties can disagree about the
interpretation of the tax code. For example, in Ritz, the court
indicated that, had the retailer had scienter when generating
documents that showed that no use tax was due or collected, the
claim may very well have succeeded. 179 Perhaps, despite the in-
centives for the retailers to comply with the simpler tax issues,
some of those cases may very well make it to court. Further, this
body of issues where reasonable parties will not disagree will
likely grow as state courts address the issues at the center of
these tax claims. ' 8 0 At some point, courts might then require par-
ties-especially retailers, who may often be sophisticated repeat
players-to understand some of the frequently litigated issues of
other states' tax codes. And once courts begin to allow such cases
to go forward, clearer precedents will follow, putting future par-
ties on notice of their obligations. 18 1
177 International Game, 127 P3d at 1093.
178 Ritz, 878 NE2d at 1166.
179 Id at 1162.
180 One may argue that the ever-changing tax codes of states may slow this process.
However, it is not clear that is the necessary effect of evolving tax codes. In fact, the
changes in tax codes might very well be passed in order to address and clarify the very
issues at hand here. In that way, such changes in state tax codes may actually help lead
to a growing body of tax issues that may properly be brought under state false claims
acts.
181 This brings up concerns about unsophisticated parties. However, the realization
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One might object to this possibility, however, and say that
state courts will not want to get their hands dirty with tax ques-
tions no matter what, and hence will use statutory loopholes like
this "knowingly" language to avoid letting such cases come before
them. The same justifications just mentioned apply here as well:
a state tax body with expertise exists and can handle such is-
sues, and in doing so will likely hand down better and more con-
sistent rulings. However, this implicates a key question: Why
would the states, who so closely modeled their false claims acts
on the Federal FCA, omit the tax exemption when passing their
own false claims acts? An objector may respond by noting that
the state legislature and judiciary are different bodies, and just
because the legislature made a decision not to exempt tax ques-
tions expressly does not mean that the judiciary will accept such
issues with open arms.
These objections, however, hold little water. A legislature
will likely do little to deter potential use tax avoiders by omitting
certain clauses from a statute. This very idea that parties such
as retailers will notice omissions from state statutes when com-
pared to federal legislation not only is unlikely, but it cuts
against the idea that the complexity of these issues lies beyond
the ken of the parties and state courts. Also, the legislature could
do much more in terms of both deterrence and clarity by includ-
ing a clause that specifically allows relators to bring tax issues,
though it might be marginally more difficult for a legislature to
pass such a statute. Furthermore, the retailers with sales and
use taxes of high enough value to give relators enough incentive
to institute a claim are likely to be those who are sophisticated
parties and repeat players, as was the case in Ritz. 182 These par-
ties will likely gain, either through continued participation or
through the advice of legal council, an understanding of how
such use tax claims will play out in court regardless of whether
these claims arise from an express grant or the lack of a denial in
state legislation.
The small number of cases on point makes it hard to deduce
a pattern or underlying theory. Perhaps the safest and most ac-
that such unsophisticated parties will ordinarily deal with much smaller sums of money
alleviates this concern, as in those cases, relators have very little incentive to bring the
suit in the first place. Also, such unsophisticated parties may not often deal in interstate
transactions, further reducing the original concern.
182 Ritz, 878 NE2d 1152 (including as defendants popular retailers Ritz Camera, Wolf
Camera, Petsmart, Armani Exchange, Amazon, Toys R Us, 1-800-Flowers, Universal
Studios, etc.)
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curate conclusion regarding the role the "knowingly" require-
ment will play in future internet purchaser qui tam actions is to
recognize that, while courts are hesitant to explore preliminary
tax issues, they have left the door open to that possibility. Two
factors will influence the likelihood that internet purchasers will
recover in use tax qui tam actions. The first factor is whether
relators can find cases involving clear tax issues with clear sci-
enter. Based on the language in Ritz, this would certainly help
the relator's cause.18 3 The second factor is whether the body of
law surrounding internet taxation issues becomes better settled.
If the number of issues about which reasonable parties may dis-
agree shrinks, relators will have a better chance winning their
case.
Beyond this lies the question of what courts should be doing
when faced with these difficult tax questions in qui tam cases.
This question implicates the tension between administrative con-
trol of tax issues and private control of qui tam actions. If indeed
there should be administrative deference to the state tax bodies
on these questions of whether there is tax liability in a certain
situation, the courts are correct to step back until state tax bod-
ies provide clarifying rulings on the law. On the other hand, the
whole purpose of qui tam actions is to make up for some sort of
administrative failing, so perhaps this is exactly where courts
should be going forward with such actions. Things are slipping
through the administrative cracks, and so courts should be will-
ing to let qui tam actions fill in those cracks.
For two reasons, courts ought to resolve this tension in favor
of the qui tam plaintiffs and should proceed with these tax issues
if at all possible. First, the state false claims acts, whose lan-
guage clearly permits such tax claim qui tam actions, should be
read liberally in favor of qui tam plaintiffs. States, who so closely
modeled their false claims after the Federal FCA, yet explicitly
omitted the language exempting tax claims, did so to permit such
actions. Courts have said as much. 8 4
Second, court decisions would in no way have to preempt
administrative action. Not only can court decisions on these mat-
ters be crafted narrowly, as these cases are highly fact-specific by
nature, but subsequent changes in the tax law would give them
no precedential weight going forward. That is, if courts somehow
183 Ritz, 878 NE2d at 1162.
184 International Game, 127 P3d at 1093 ("[P]rivate plaintiffs may properly bring false
claims actions based on tax deficiencies under some circumstances.!).
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misapplied the tax law, further administrative clarifications or
modifications of the tax law would reduce or eliminate the im-
pact of such a decision. In fact, such court decisions can even
serve to identify what pieces of the tax law need administrative
clarification and incentivize and direct future modifications of
the tax law.
B. Websites As Sources of Public Information
All state statutes prohibit certain claims from being brought
based upon public disclosures. 85 Most of these states discuss this
exception using language closely similar, if not identical to the
language in the Federal FCA, which itself indicates that "public
disclosures" include "allegations or transactions in a criminal,
civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, administra-
tive, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or
investigation, or from the news media."'1 6 For instance, the Ne-
vada statute says:
No action may be maintained pursuant to this chapter
that is based upon the public disclosure of allegations or
transactions in a criminal, civil or administrative hearing,
in an investigation, report, hearing or audit conducted by
or at the request of a house of the legislature, an auditor
or the governing body of a political subdivision, or from
the news media, unless the action is brought by the attor-
ney general or an original source of the information. 187
Federal courts have consistently excluded those sources not
listed as constituting original sources.188 Internet sources may
pose a new problem--one that courts have not yet addressed. For
instance, would a financial report compiled voluntarily and
posted on a publicly traded corporation's website fall into any of
185 See Cal Gov Code § 12652(d)(3)(A) (West 2000); 6 Del Code Ann § 1206(C) (West
2000); Fla Stat Ann § 68.087(3) (West 2003); Ga Code Ann § 49-4-168.2(j)(2) (West 2007);
Haw Rev Stat § 661-28 (2007); 740 ILCS 175/4(e)(4)(A) (West 2007); Ind Code 5-11-5.5-
7(f) (2006); La Rev Stat Ann 46:439.1(E) (West 1999); Mass Ann Laws ch 12, § 5G(3)
(West 2000); Mich Comp Laws § 400.610a(13) (2005); Mont Code Ann 17-8-403(5) (West
2007); NH Rev Stat § 167:61-e(II)(d) (2004); NM Stat Ann ch 1978, § 27-14-10 (West
2004); NY Stat Fin Law § 190(9) (2007); Nev Rev Stat § 357.100 (2007); 63 Okla Stat
§ 5053.5 (2007); Tenn Code Ann § 71-5-183(d)(2)(A) (West 2007); Tex Hum Res Code Ann
§ 36.113 (West 2001); Va Code Ann § 8.01-216.8 (West 2003).
186 31 USC § 3730(e)(4)(A).
187 Nev Rev Stat § 357 (2007).
188 See, for example, Dunleavy, 123 F3d at 746 (holding that exclusion occurs "only
when information has been publicly disclosed through an enumerated method").
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the categories?189 After a quick glance, it does not seem to fit into
any of the categories. However, in some sense, the information
seems quite public. The publicly traded corporation is posting
information on its website for anyone with internet access to
view. The only requirement for being able to view the material is
having internet access. However, that is a requirement a growing
number of people meet today. Furthermore, a minor requirement
in order to access the information has not prevented courts from
finding information to be publicly disclosed. 190 As the amount of
content available online grows, and as the number of people who
have internet access grows, courts will face the question of how
to treat online information more often.
Two scenarios seem possible if a court indeed addresses the
issue of information on a public website. A first option is for the
court to treat online information no differently than it treats any
other information. The court can look at the information and de-
cide if it falls into one of the categories enumerated in the perti-
nent statute. This scenario, though it keeps with precedent, may
not at first provide much certainty, for it still leaves unanswered
what type of information from a website a court will include in
the enumerated categories. This may not be a problem, for per-
haps the online information will just be an electronic version of
the same types of information courts typically encounter.191 Yet
this might not be the case. The costs of publishing information
online are lower than producing print or other media versions of
the information, in which case online retailers and other compa-
nies may start providing more information online. 192 This gen-
eral question will likely remain unanswered until courts answer
it themselves.
189 Many online retailers have annual reports available online. See, for example,
Amazon.com's 2006 Annual Report, available at <http://media.corporate-ir.net/media.
files/iroII97/97664I2006AnnualReport.pdf> (last visited May 10, 2008).
190 The easiest example to see this is with the news media category. A person cannot
know of information in a newspaper without getting a copy of a newspaper. A person
cannot learn of something on the television news if that person does not have access to a
television set.
191 For example, online retailers often provide fairly standard information, such as
annual reports, stock price information, and SEC filings. See, for example. J.Crew's SEC
Filings, available at <http://www.jcrew.com/content/investorrelations/filings.jhtml> (last
visited May 10, 2008).
192 Companies might, for instance, find it beneficial to make available to potential
investors all sorts of information it would not choose to make available were the only
other option printing the material in a hard copy report. This, however, is in and of itself
not a reason that courts cannot look to the current categories in the statutes and inquire
whether the information fits in any of those categories.
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The second option is for the court to come up with new tests
for determining whether information on a website is publicly dis-
closed. Courts may consider things such as how easy it is for a
user to navigate to the information on the page and how many
people have access to the website. Is the website an active link
that users can access from the company's main page? Is it a link
whose URL must be typed directly into a browser to access it?
Does this website require a subscription or membership agree-
ment to access certain information?
This type of new test, however, may prove unhelpful. Prece-
dent, albeit not from cases involving websites, suggests that both
the low probability of finding information and the reduced acces-
sibility to the information has no effect on whether the court will
find the material as publicly disclosed. For instance, in John Doe
v John Doe Corp, the court made the sweeping statement that
any information placed in the "public domain" constituted a pub-
lic disclosure. 93 Of course this may do little to clarify things, as
it leaves unanswered the question of what constitutes the public
domain. Answering this question may very well entail asking
some of the same questions just mentioned.
Admittedly, Doe dealt with accusations of fraud leaking into
the public domain, which may factually differentiate it from in-
formation willingly disclosed on a website. 194 However, the court
does not put much weight on the type of fact that leaked into the
public domain. 195 It instead looks to issues such as the level of
accessibility of the information, and notes that information need
not be accessible to all members of the public for it to be consid-
ered publicly disclosed. 196 This strengthens a claim that informa-
tion available on a public website, even if located on a page to
which few if any users navigate, constitutes information in the
public domain.
However, disqualifying this information under the public
disclosure ban creates the problem of bad incentives and possible
loopholes for online retailers. Such retailers may then place in-
formation of illegal tax activities, such as admissions of use taxes
not collected, in an obscure corner of their website with the pur-
pose of protecting themselves against qui tam actions that may
later arise. Including the information on a website may auto-
193 960 F2d at 320.
194 Id at 322.
195 Id.
196 Id.
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matically classify the information as publicly disclosed, hence
barring any relator from using that information to bring a qui
tam action against the retailer. There is an admitted danger of a
perverse exclusion. 197 However, it would not be difficult for legis-
latures to legislate around this, or for courts to make an excep-
tion. 198 Furthermore, this public disclosure exception does not
apply when the attorney general commences the suit, so retailers
would not completely avoid chances of liability through such
schemes.
Another argument that such information should or will be
considered as a public disclosure is that it fits into the news me-
dia category. Courts have traditionally interpreted news media
to mean television, magazines, and newspapers. 199 However, as
an increasing number of people use the internet for their news,
courts may indeed lump internet information into the news me-
dia category. This broadening of the news media category is fur-
ther supported by the Grayson court's finding in a California case
that news media includes scholarly journals and periodicals. 200
Yet if courts do expand the news media category further to
include a large portion of website content, they run the danger of
excluding too much information as publicly accessible. For if any
information on websites fits into the news media category, again
retailers and other such possible defendants have bad incentives,
as mentioned above, to disclose wrongdoings on their websites.
Though again, courts may be able to weed out those cases, legis-
latures may be able to legislate around them, and attorneys gen-
eral may be able to institute the suit on behalf of the govern-
ment.
The better of these two possible solutions seems to be to
treat online information no differently from other forms of infor-
197 See, for example, Findley, 105 F3d at 682-84 (throwing out claims alleging that
government employees' clubs that earn revenue from vending services on federal property
violate the FCA by retaining money owed the government, even though the relator did
not rely on the public disclosure to bring the suit, because the relator was not an original
source and merely echoed information that was publicly available).
198 For instance, a legislature could exempt as public disclosures any website postings
that are deemed to be hidden, or can exempt as public disclosures information posted by a
company for the sole purpose of avoiding qui tam actions. This wording might, however,
lead to difficult judicial inquiries, such as what constitutes hidden postings, or when a
company has deliberately tried to avoid a qui tam action.
199 See, for example, McKenzie v Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc, 123 F3d 935 (6th
Cir 1997).
200 Grayson, 142 Cal App 4th at 754-55 (noting that nothing in either the statutory
language or public policy considerations indicates that news media should include only
newspapers).
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mation. This method enjoys two benefits. First, as mentioned, it
is consistent with methods used to this point, and as such, will
not disrupt the current judicial standards. And while online in-
formation may present some new problems, there is no reason to
think that information disclosed on the internet will differ in any
way substantial enough to justify a completely new test. Second,
this method helps preserve the goals of the false claims acts. Re-
call that Lincoln originally urged for the passing of the Federal
FCA to provide a tool to help fight fraud against the govern-
ment.201 Subsequent amendments preserved this purpose while
helping prevent parasitic suits. 202 The basic idea was to create an
FCA and related judicial standard that rewarded relators who
contributed work to the case. 20 3 Allowing relators to use informa-
tion from a website that does not otherwise fit into one of the
categories in the false claims acts preserves incentives for rela-
tors to do research and help the government combat fraud, with-
out allowing relators to exploit truly public information that fits
into the list of categories. 20 4
C. Documents Resulting from Internet Purchases
Given the analyses in Parts A and B above, information con-
tained in a document resulting from an internet purchase-such
as a receipt-should not constitute public information for the
purposes of false claims statutes. First of all, assuming courts
will stick with the statutory enumeration of public sources, a
sales receipt does not naturally fit into any of the categories. 20 5
Beyond that, this purchase agreement looks quite similar to a
classic set of false claims cases, those arising in hospital settings
201 2d Sess in 132 Cong Rec H 6474 (Sept 9, 1986) (statement of Representative Ber-
man).
202 See Doe, 960 F2d at 319.
203 See, for example, Federal Recovery Services, 72 F3d at 451.
204 For example, there is a distinct difference between using information disclosed due
to a criminal hearing, and using information in a financial document posted on a com-
pany's website. The relator is not trying to exploit something that has been involved in
public proceedings, but has uncovered a piece of information through his or her own work.
205 Note that the courts in Ritz and International Game did not specifically discuss the
issue of whether the documents memorializing the sales were public disclosures. Thus
there is no definitive answer from the case law, yet it seems likely that had the courts
considered the records invalid forms of information, they would have noted as such. Fur-
ther, their language about possible future suits by online purchasers would be contra-
dicted, at least in part, by an exclusion of such material.
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where doctors or patients bring false claims suits against manu-
facturers, sellers, or distributors. 20 6
Beyond this, one might argue that anyone can make pur-
chases from an online company and discover that the company is
fraudulently withholding taxes from the government. This ar-
gument, however, both proves too much and misses the purpose
of false claims statutes. It proves too much, for in most false
claims acts, one could imagine any number of situations where a
citizen might stumble across the discovery of fraud. Yet just be-
cause several, or even most, people could have found themselves
in the relator's shoes does not mean the actual relator should not
be able to bring suit. And in that way, the objection misunder-
stands a purpose of the false claims acts. After all, one of the
main, if not the main, purpose of the false claims acts, was to
incentivize private parties to bring actions on behalf of the gov-
ernment and provide channels for such actions. 207 Such stringent
restrictions would go against the very nature of the acts.
A caveat to this allowed category of qui tam actions is that
other information outside of that contained on the receipt may
bar the action. For instance, if a purchaser notices information
on a receipt that indicates tax fraud by a retailer, yet other pub-
licly disclosed information may already point to this same fraud,
in which case the purchaser may be barred from bringing the
action. 208
VI. CONCLUSION
Both federal and state false claims acts seek to provide citi-
zens with the necessary means to assist the state and federal
governments in fighting fraud against the government. One such
area where fraud can take place is in avoidance of taxes. While
the Federal False Claims Act expressly exempts such actions
from being brought by citizens, many state statutes make no
206 See, for example, Schmidt v Zimmer, Inc, 386 F3d 235, 245 (3d Cir 2004) (ruling
for relators in an FCA claim against seller of orthopedic implants when seller knowingly
assisted in causing government to pay claims grounded in fraud).
207 Rapsanti, 71 Temp L Rev at 27 (cited in note 8).
208 See, for example, Doe, 960 F2d at 320.
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such exemptions. State courts have indicated that relators may,
in some instances, be able to bring tax claims through state false
claims acts. In fact, several online purchasers have brought
claims alleging use tax violations. However, in part because the
tax issues involved were messy, state tax courts have as of yet
not allowed these online purchasers to win their qui tam claims.
This leads to the questions of whether an online purchaser
should be able to bring a successful qui tam action alleging a use
tax violation, and if so, under what circumstances. This Com-
ment shows that a purchaser of goods over the internet can in-
deed serve as a whistleblower and bring a successful use tax
claim through state false claims statutes that do not strictly for-
bid such claims. Relators must first be able to meet the "know-
ingly" standard set out in state false claims statutes. To do this,
they must show that the online retailers knowingly reduced a
debt owed to the government. This is a difficult standard to meet,
however if the right cases comes before the court-a case involv-
ing simple tax issues-or as the tax law involving internet taxa-
tion issues becomes more settled, relators may find more success
in meeting this standard. In situations where online purchasers
can meet this standard, they can use certain information-
information unique to them and not available to the public at
large, such as a receipt from a sales transaction-to win their
suit. Whether courts will allow relators to use other types of in-
formation available on websites, information that does not fit
into any of the categories listed in state false claims acts, re-
mains an unanswered question. When faced with this question,
courts should leave in place the existing inquiries to serve judi-
cial consistency and the function of false claims acts in general.
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